This work attempts to capture the critical issues plaguing Cuba's continual economic dependency and suggests potential avenues for greater foreign direct investment. For the past year, I have been working to develop a framework to assess the current state of the Cuban economy in relation to foreign investment. However, I must acknowledge a few key limitations of my research. First, Cuba's economic data is scarce and has often been criticized as unreliable or contradictory. Second, as Cuba operates a dual currency system, the actual cost and value of goods is difficult to calculate since the currencies trade at an artificial and fluctuating exchange rate. Third, bias of official reporting of Cuban economic studies and statistics is rampant and difficult to gauge: the Castro government has a long history of internal disagreement regarding the interpretation of official data. This has resulted over the years in extremely divergent and even contradictory official economic analyses.
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I. Introduction
After fifty years of governance within a closed economic system, Cuba has initiated a move to integrate into the world market. With its current economy nearing complete bankruptcy, however, lingering international distrust, as a result of its complete nationalization without compensation of foreign and domestic businesses in the 1960s, and suspicion about the accuracy of the government's current official economic statistics, many multinational businesses remain wary of investing significantly in Cuba. Moreover, the U.S.
embargo against Cuba places major restrictions on the import and export of goods and limits most Americans from traveling to Cuba unless they have a legal purpose for doing so.
While many adverse conditions still exist for foreign investment in Cuba, the island's government has implemented a new foreign investment law that would greatly benefit multinational corporations and attempts to foster an environment of support for public-private partnerships. 1 Since President Raul Castro has stated that he will not remain at the head of state for long, and Cuban leaders assume that the embargo will soon be lifted, government officials are scrambling to transition the economy in preparation for these events. In reaction to these realities, economists in Cuba and abroad have set out to create a framework for assessing Cuba's economic future and to develop meaningful comparisons to other transitional economies. The goal of these studies is to find an economic path that is both sustainable and effective.
To begin, this paper will carefully assess the prospects of foreign investment in Cuba.
Next, the paper presents a review of the relevant literature in the field of developmental and Caribbean economics. Finally, the third section will present a historical overview of both Cuba's long-enduring economic dependency and the more recent reforms of Raul Castro and an analysis of the current economy in relation to the goals of the revolution. From this intensive historical and present-day study of the economy, the future prospects of the economy will be considered leading to in-depth examination of the advantages and disadvantages of foreign investment. A brief conclusion will summate this paper and close with a personal anecdote emblematic of Cuba's future.
II. Relevant Literature
The Plantation Economy
Lloyd Best and Kari Levitt's Essays on the Theory of Plantation Economy develops a
new conceptualization of the Caribbean economy. Through of a series of complex case studies, the authors offer an ideological alternative to neo-liberalization and promote a different understanding of the Caribbean region. Their perspective of the plantation economy argues that the economies of Caribbean islands are fairly homogenous -detailing similarities among Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Dominican Republican -and lays out a system of reasoning for why the region should be viewed differently than the rest of the world. 2 The theory of the plantation economy originates from the historically agricultural-based system reliant on slave labor, which was more lucrative for the investing state, Spain, than the domestic workers. The centuries of exploitation points to a systemic phenomenon that favors an imbalance of trade, creating an economic dependency model. The theory of plantation economy's structural approach attempts to explain why the Caribbean islands "undergo alternating cycles of 'boom' and 'bust', why periods of boom are not self-sustaining, and why adjustment during the bust does not free the economy from dependence." The plantation economy, in short, represents the foreign-owned and export-oriented sector, and key examples are agriculture, mining, and tourism. The link to both slavery and exploitation by the foreign sovereign can easily be found in all of these sectors, and until a Caribbean economy diminishes these areas and replaces them with residentiary sectors like manufacturing, foreign dependency will sharply characterize the economic fate of the island.
In Best and Levitt's interpretation, the theory of plantation economy does not embrace a fatalistic approach; instead it presents a method of re-conceptualizing the Caribbean structural approach to economics in order to explain the historical difficulties that these economically homogenous countries have faced as they attempt to modernize and become more independent and self-sufficient. Although the essays were written more than 50 years ago, the same issues are still present in Cuba. It has not advanced its residentiary sector, and it maintains a strong reliance on its plantation economy as the basis of an export-oriented, foreign-dependent economy. Past examples of the adverse effects of this overreliance are plentiful.
Import-Substitution Industrialization
Related to the theory of plantation economy but more expansive in terms of regional and global inclusion, import-substitution industrialization is a structural approach to economics that attempts to explain what policies account for the difference between developed and developing nations. In other words, the import-substitution model addresses the systemic issues that lead to mass poverty in low-income nations. 4 The long-term cause is generally linked to the dominance of agriculture or mining in an exploited country as opposed to the diversified, service-based economy of an industrialized country. 5 Linus Thomas' review of Raul Prebisch's economic development theory reinforces this root cause:
A disproportionate amount of the benefits of technological progress seemed to accrue to the Center [developed countries] leaving the periphery [underdeveloped countries] with nothing but labor-intensive activities. Since labor is generally abundant in these economies, the rewards for technological improvements are very low in both production of the traditional goods and the emerging manufacturing industries.
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Since the global economic paradigm concentrates technological and capital advancements in industrialized countries, low-income countries struggle to grow -only attracting industries that need inexpensive labor -and ultimately lack highly profitable manufacturing and service-based firms.
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The theory suggests that these countries should invest in replacing imports by manufacturing them domestically and setting up trade barriers to protect these industries against the better established companies in high-income countries. After World War II, many countries of Latin America actively implemented state-sponsored policies of importsubstitution industrialization as they sought to escape the market volatility they suffered during the first half of the twentieth century and to avoid the devastating impact of another Great Depression. Economic analyses, including critiques and reconsiderations of these policies have proliferated over the last several decades.
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Common aspects of these essays support a few weaknesses and strengths of importsubstitution industrialization. In most cases, gross domestic product increased, but the growth did not keep up with the accumulated foreign debt that was required to carry out these sweeping reforms and take on the various capital projects needed to make goods domestically. The import of needed capital goods alone often outweighed the profits made from the product. In addition, the quality of domestically made goods were often well below international standards while their prices were well above. The attempt by some countries to make automobiles demonstrates well this set of problems:
A study by Baranson of automobile industries in developing countries (which includes information on Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico)… finds that among the main deficiencies are '… underdeveloped supplier capacities, inadequate quality control systems, and a dearth of qualified technicians and managers…' Thus, Baranson found that many '… basic materials that are considered standard stock in open economies often must be procured locally or specially ordered in small batches at considerably higher cost or at inferior quality... Lack of uniformity in raw materials and semifinished goods such as castings and forgings creates special problems in milling and machining to required specifications. In high-volume production, precision and uniformity are built into automated equipment. Developing countries with limited markets are much more dependent upon the very machine labor skills in which they are deficient.' Also, considering the many parts which go into an automobile, Baranson found that outside plant procurement averages about 60 per cent by value in advanced economies, while in countries like Mexico and Brazil this factor amounts to only 40 per cent. Such a condition further reduces the possibility of economies of large scale production. As a result, Baranson found that factory costs in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico were about 60 per cent to 150 per cent higher than in the United States.
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This evaluation of a specific sector yields critical data needed to surmise the usefulness of import-substitution industrialization. First, the automobile industry serves as a failed experiment of import-substitution, and from a cost perspective, it highlights the difficulty of competing with highly advanced countries and the importance of economies of scale. Closing the domestic economy by adding tariffs eliminates foreign competition, thereby, creating inefficiencies in the market. Moreover, as a country creates tariffs and prevents imports from flowing into the state, it simultaneously limits its economic potential for exports: "A country that is closed for imports is closed for exports." 10 Although a negative for the global economy, protectionism in certain cases helps a developing country scale its production of a good in order to compete globally eventually.
Another takeaway from the Latin American experience involves the importance of local raw materials and resources. Countries without the necessary raw materials for production must make trade deals to acquire them. This reveals several key drawbacks.
First, it makes the finished product susceptible to the volatile commodity prices of the intermediate goods. Second, the country requires proper supply-chain management in order to avoid major shortages and surpluses of raw materials. Third, the state needs scale to negotiate a better price for the raw material, or the cost will be too great to compete with advanced countries that receive or extract the materials for a much cheaper price. These lessons must be heeded for an import-substitution model to function properly. The Latin
American example of import-substitution as a whole "was indiscriminate, that is, there were not attempts to concentrate on industrial sectors which might have had a potential comparative advantage." 11 Coupled with the economic shortages was widespread official corruption that resulted in the waste of a staggering of money and resources. General widespread state mismanagement generally added to the failure.
Comparative Advantage -Export Oriented Industrialization
The basis of comparative advantage relies on the principle that goods and services have factor intensities and are either capital-intensive or labor-intensive, and as such, a particular location offers optimal production. 12 As previously discussed, labor-intensive goods will generally become associated with poorer countries, and capital intensive-goods will gravitate toward advanced economies where capital is relatively cheaper. why multinational firms exist and have advantages than on the international flows of money per se.
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Although trade and foreign investments are generally viewed by the imports and exports of a country or its trade balance or imbalance, the necessary component -in terms of analysis -is the industrial organization. Control over the manufacturing and operations (or the contracting) of a domestic company poses a difficult choice for firms; however, according to Kenneth Froot, control over the investment creates a more efficient operation. 22 Cuba's jointventures, therefore, might lead to small inefficiencies, but the domestic profit will generally offset the loss of production. Economic gains of foreign-direct investment for a host country include income tax and indirect benefits to the private sector through spill-overs of productivity. 23 The likelihood of foreign direct investment increases in industries that consist of corporations with strong financial moats: "Where products are differentiated, reputation is vital, and technology is firm specific and constantly improving." 24 While other companies and industries might be targets of foreign investment, the majority of firms will have common links to the previous industry description. A concern of host countries about foreign direct investment considers how well domestic companies can compete with foreign subsidiaries. Drawing upon examples from Japan, China and Korea, scholars have shown that these countries had rigid investment laws that helped protect their local businesses, giving them time to increase production. 25 As for the difficulty of attracting investment, firms require a concrete reason why they should make foreign investments in a country as opposed to simply trading with that country:
Direct invest investment will be chosen instead of, or adjunct to, trade only to the extent that the location offers a substantial advantage to the company. This advantage may result from the unusual comparative advantage as reflected in lower production costs. Barriers to imports or other host-country policy inducements also play a role in determining the most advantageous location for production.
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In this context, Cuba has strengths for attracting foreign direct investment in three different categories; 1) its natural resources including mining, potential oil reserves, and its tropical environment; 2) its highly educated population helps differentiate Cuba's human capital especially at its lower relative wages; and 3) Cuba's market is fairly closed to external agents, making corporations more apt to attempt to penetrate the market.
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Cuba faces extra obstacles as it attempts to seek out foreign direct investment. Over the past fifty years, Cuba has acted in bad faith in a variety of ways including the expropriation of U.S. businesses and the false reporting of its economic data. 28 As such, trust becomes relevant to the discussion of a firm's willingness to invest in Cuba. Fukuyama defines trust as "the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of the community."
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In relation to trust, Fukuyama prescribes social capital as "a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society. 30 States or actors evaluate the social capital of others through cultural tendencies like historical precedent. Thus, a historical economic review becomes critical to the evaluation of a country's ability to attract foreign direct investment. Once trust has been lost in a society, it is very difficult to regain:
Social capital is like a ratchet that is more easily turned in one direction than another; it can be dissipated by the actions of governments much more readily than those governments can build it up again. The lack of social capital makes an investment in Cuba less appealing, and as such, a higher risk premium must be applied. Since Cuba's growth potential is high and most of its land remains untapped, the effect of minimal social capital is rather limited. However, if the Cuban government continues to expropriate land, cancel contracts, and make foreign investing difficult, the trust factor's relative importance will rise exponentially. Even if a democratic transition takes place, simultaneous capitalistic reforms must also occur in order to maintain a democratic order and reestablish trust. 32 Fukuyama prescribes these capitalistic reforms as necessary because they help create "firms, entrepreneurs, markets and competition" through the development of capitalistic institutions, and he points to the difficulties that the Eastern European countries faced as they attempted to transition into democracies after the fall of Soviet Union. 33 Cuba diverges from these historical examples in this regard, however.
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Fukuyama's overall theory of trust does provide a lens through which to see Cuba:
"Low-trust societies, by contrast, must fence in and isolate their workers with a series of its social capital. The disadvantages of a command economy with low social capital are that most of its companies will be inefficient and corruption will rise.
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Political risk also plays a critical role in the pursuit of foreign direct investment since "The absence of supranational courts limits legal remedies and where an investor's foreign nationality limits redress through domestic political institutions." 38 In Cuba, the government controls both the courts and the institutions, and the centralization of power allows most of the decisions to be made a higher level, creating significant political risk. Article 60 of the 2014 Foreign Investment Act explains the process of settling disputes, and it essentially vests all the power into the Economic Division of the particular Provincial People's Court. 39 An illustration of the significance of this section involves the right to terminate or renew a contract. If the government decides that a foreign corporation has violated a section of the foreign investment contract, the contract can be terminated, and the only legal remedy the corporation has is to appeal the termination to the provincial court, which is an extension of the government. Thus, the final decision will not be made by a neutral, third party.
Political risk also includes the historical acts of the government. The determination of the sustained impact of past acts of expropriation and default play a key role in calculating the political risk associated with investments in Cuba. While a company that has had its assets expropriated would most likely avoid future investment, other companies that were not directly affected by past acts of expropriation would still consider investment as long as the reward was worth the incentive. Cuba offers a completely new market for investors, and as such, the island compels foreign companies to invest in its potential. investing in Cuba; however, once the government lifts it, companies will be more likely to try and penetrate the Cuban market. The next political transition will have a tremendous effect on the risk associated with investment. When Raul Castro steps down, his successor will create a new perspective from which to judge the trustworthiness of investment. If risk averse, the leader will be motivated to expropriate foreign assets in bad times; however, if the next president does not fear risk, he or she might be willing to centralize foreign investment in good times in order to fortify power and control. 40 These considerations should be carefully evaluated by companies looking to invest, and as such, the successor should work to establish a reputation of trust and ethical behavior.
This literature review suggests a few economic principles that will guide the analysis of Cuba's foreign investment prospects. First, Cuba must build its residentiary sector, but the focus should be on only areas of comparative advantage. Protective laws and barriers are required to stabilize economic transition and prevent a resurgence of economic dependence.
Strategic planning by the state sector needs to be implemented in order to create incentives for foreign investment and growth. Diversification is necessary; however, the diversity of exports should be limited to the fields of comparative advantage. Cuba must build its social capital. It must select an economic model that promotes the market and allows firms and entrepreneurs to thrive.
Moreover, after making its selection, Cuba must maintain its course. Cuba has a long history of reversing its trajectory, often relying more on idealism and less on a sound plan.
This next economic policy must be grounded in reality, and the government must show how the revenue totals more than cost. To the outside world, Cuba must project a new self: a country that cares about its international image. It must make timely payments on its debt, eliminate its dual currency system. and join the modern world. Cuba must embrace its highly educated population and attract investment that focuses on work that needs highly educated labor. In addition, Cuba must develop methods to keep this population from leaving; without its sharpest minds, Cuba will be at a major disadvantage as it reintegrates into the world economy. While this study has primarily addresses the external sector, the social capital must also be improved domestically in order to advance the quality of life of citizens. One of the best options for improving the standard of living is by promoting entrepreneurship and removing the barriers to entry.
Cuba must reexamine the progress it has made on its revolutionary goals. Through its platform of growth with equity, Cuba has expanded the literacy rate, improved public schooling, and advanced the healthcare sector. The next economy policy must account for these gains, and economic growth should only be pursued when it does not force the government to sacrifice these achievements or the equity that was created throughout the second half of the twentieth century.
III. Historical Overview of Cuban Economic Dependency
For the past 500 years Cuba has struggled to be self-sufficient and independent, and it has a complex history of economic dependency and monoculture exportation. During the early history of Cuba after its discovery by Spain, the small native population was nearly exterminated, and thus, the Spaniards created a two-class system or plantation system, which consisted of a wealthy land-owing elite and a slave class. Since the native population had almost totally perished as a result of disease and conquest, the Spanish had to import a huge population of African slaves. Present-day Cuban culture and ethnicity can be traced back to the sixteenth century with the import of African slaves. Through its global merchant fleet, Cuba's advantage as it embarked on establishing a new economic plan. Limiting the analysis of how these credits were utilized is the fact that "it is particularly difficult to evaluate the quality of Soviet aid to Cuba because of the paucity of materials on the subject." 48 However, with that acknowledged, the available information still allows an informed judgment on governmental policies of the first cycle.
Cuba attempted to model its economic transition after Czechoslovakia, purchasing industrial equipment from the country. Che Guevara spent time in Eastern Europe studying its economic functions and manufacturing capabilities, and upon his return to Cuba, he set out an ambitious task of diversification and import-substitution industrialization. While plans were drawn, they were somewhat haphazard as reforms were instituted almost impulsively.
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The agrarian land reform and diversification of crops yielded unexpected downturns in the sugar industry. 50 The idealism and raw ambition combined in an attempt to overhaul completely a capitalistic society into a state-controlled command economy. Interestingly enough, Castro disagreed with the communist model favoring a less intense socialist model. Nevertheless, whatever model the government found preferential did not endure.
The failure of the early transition of the economy was four-fold. First, the economic plan was rough, vague, and even non-existent in some areas. Second, the Czech model was a poor fit for Cuba, and following its manufacturing strategies did not promote the growth that the leaders expected. Third, the forced transition of the agricultural sector away from sugar and the rapid collectivization of land lacked stability and foresight, leading to significant declines in sugar production -the main export of the time. Fourth, the Cuban government's political differences with the United States and its desire for equitable wealth distribution created a mass exodus of managers and business leaders whose talent was needed during the After the unsuccessful first sub-cycle, a deliberative movement back to the monoculture export of sugar occurred. In 1961, sugar production totaled 6.7 million tons, but by 1964, total production had decreased to 3.8 million tons, a 43% reduction in output.
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Realizing the policies were unsustainable, Fidel Castro famously proclaimed that Cuba would ramp up sugar production to 10 million tons by 1970 -a complete departure from the 
Second Cycle: Export-Oriented
Now solely responsible for the economy, Castro introduced a new strategy of concentrating on sugar production. Unfortunately, the increase in production barely surpassed the production levels of 1961, and by 1970, Cuba only reached 8.5 million tons, 15 percent less than its forecasted goal and barely above the sugar-production levels of the 1950s.
Moreover, it represents less than a 3 percent annual growth rate of sugar production during the 1960s. Therefore, it was actually a rather small feat of economic capability, particularly
given that the regime focused all of its attention and energy on this goal. Although less impressive with further analysis, the policy change did expand sugar production 2.5 times Office of Statistics in order to determine validity (See Figure 2) . The years 1950 The years , 1955 The years , 1960 The years , 1965 The years , 1970 The years , and 1975 are taken from the Annual Report of the External Sector of the Cuban Economy, which is published by the Cuban National Office of Statistics. The value of the imports and exports are in millions of pesos. The years 1957 The years , 1968 The years , 1970 The years , 1972 The years , 1974 The years , and 1975 This report reflects the Soviet mindset toward the CMEA in 1960, and while its official stance was to restrict the CMEA to European states, the Soviet Union still advocated for a broad partnership with Cuba and asked the Czechoslovak trade representatives to assist in the financing of Cuban development. However, Che, in fact, did not specifically request membership in the CMEA because at that time the Cuban government still hoped to be able to broadly diversify its trade relationships beyond the Soviet bloc. Moreover, a few political disagreements, including the Soviet decision to remove the missiles from Cuba without informing Fidel Castro, prolonged the time period before the Soviet Union finally admitted Cuba into the CMEA. Without these political differences, the Cuba government might have prospered much earlier, and speculatively, the economy might have been in a better position to withstand the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.
The trade benefits from the CMEA were substantial; however, Soviet aid outpaced those benefits. Figure 3 compares the aid given to Cuba to the aid received by Vietnam. This significant difference underscores the high value of Cuba's geopolitical location and its degree of dependency. A closer observation reveals that the Vietnamese invested their aid in rapidly expanding sectors that produced prosperity while the Cubans failed to invest at all in sectors that produced growth. In fact, economists have confirmed that much of the Soviet aid was never invested in the economy at all. Certainly it was not invested in an effort to enhance economic self-sufficiency.
60 Ibid 9-10. equate to a subsidy of almost $9 billion. This drastic overpayment for sugar describes one method the Soviet Union subsidized the Castro government. Real issues developed from the rich amounts of aid that the Soviet Union gave to Cuba. First, the cost of production became distorted. Since the Soviet Union paid a premium above the world sugar price, Cuba did not have to compete with the price and quality of the rest of the world, leading to lags in production. Second, the Soviet Union sold oil to the Cubans at well below the world price.
The re-exporting of oil on the world market amounted to one of the island's top hardcurrency earners. Cuba became accustomed to re-exporting oil that it did not consume.
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This reliance on re-exportation created a high degree of dependency because the profit depended on aid. 
Fifth and Sixth Cycles: Special Period in Time of Peace and Restructuring
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the tightening of the U.S. embargo in 1996, Cuba became independent of influence with the exception of the negative pressure from the embargo. The economies of the European Union and Latin America distanced themselves from the Cuban crisis, and the island faced extreme economic perils.
Characterized as the Special Period in Time of Peace, poverty rates skyrocketed, and economic production virtually stopped. For the first time in its history, Cuba had finally achieved independence, and its economy was rapidly collapsing. Castro worked to motivate
Cubans to work without wage in order to fulfill the ideals of the revolution, and he labeled these years as the "special period," which he insisted would, through hard work, lead to economic prosperity. He revitalized his call to each Cuban to become the "new man" and offered moral incentives in lieu of salaries.
While the Spanish, American and Soviet periods have been addressed, the past 25 years also support the idea that the Cubans turned to other countries to make the investments.
Castro actively sought out international partners during the Special Period, and he leveraged his shared socialist virtues with newly transitioning Latin American states. This connection led to a lucrative partnership with Venezuela. Through a creative deal, Cuba exchanged doctors for oil and then took a hefty cut of the doctors' wages to fund the government. The government opened its poorly performing industries to foreign investment and attracted Canadian's Sherritt Corporation to modernize its nickel mining industry.
IV. Modern-day Reforms
Since gaining office in 2006 Raul Castro has initiated a new phase. Accelerating privatization, that began out of necessity in the 1990s, revising foreign investment laws, and expanding tourism has strengthened the economy slightly. His announcement that he plans to step down in 2018 has stimulated more reforms, which has helped to build domestic confidence in the government. Cuba's long pre-revolutionary tradition of being highly entrepreneurial and productive, economists hope, will contribute to the current effort to recover. One of Cuba's most valuable sources of hard currency is its export of human capital. The government has for years sent abroad doctors, coaches and trainers, and other professionals to serve the needs of other countries. The government is paid for these services, and it pays the professionals the going wage in Cuba. Another significant source of hard currency in Cuba are remittances sent to Cuba from Cubans and Cuban-Americans living in the United States. The third most profitable sector is tourism. All three of these economic sectors depend on an international flow of goods and services. The government continues to struggle to attract investment and draw on the global supply of goods and services, while avoiding the creation of another highly dependent economic relationship.
This historical context provides the framework for assessing the Cuban economic model and the necessary economic changes.
The bewildering issue that continues to plague Cuba is its inefficiency and lack of production. After extensive analyses of the Cuba economy, economists have found that 3 percent of government corporations accounted for 75 percent of the state's profit. This revelation remained shrouded by the dual currency system, which allowed state enterprises to veil their profit margins and losses. By 2016, the government hoped to transition 2 million people to non-state sectors, roughly 40 percent of the labor force. 63 However, in 2014, only 600,000 workers had been restructured to the private sector. Unfortunately, the movement of workers to entrepreneurship did not yield the expected results: "Whereas the global average is for one self-employed to employ five others, the situation in Cuba is completely the opposite (only one out of five creating one additional job)." 64 If Cuba had followed the global average, there would already be 2.5 million people working in private enterprises; however, the stifling taxes, licensing fees, and mistrust of the government have prevented this growth.
In a way, this reflects Cuba's poor social capital as it is unable to create new jobs at the same rate as other comparable countries.
Besides simply transitioning workers from the state sector, the government must also address the inefficiencies and corruption found in state enterprises; for example, in 2008, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security through an in-depth survey found that almost 50 percent of state employees were arriving to work late. 65 The deeply rooted and systemic problem of inefficiency highlights how badly the economy is performing. In 2009 the government finally abandoned the lunch it provided to more than 3.5 million workers and replaced it with a 15 pesos per week raise in wage, approximately $0.60. 66 While a small raise relative to the U.S. dollar, the increase was rather significant since most Cuban workers received less than 500 pesos a month. The shift also foreshadowed a movement by the government to eliminate underperforming public services in favor of public sector growth.
Although reports might not publically suggest the support of private entrepreneurship and many of the laws and taxes hamper private economic growth and employment, the fundamental shift expanded business opportunities for local restaurants that do not target tourists.
V. Prospects of Foreign Investment
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba has made various attempts to garner foreign direct investment in order to replace its largest trading partner, but for every promotional action it has made, the government has regressed and made investments riskier.
The government tends to redo its foreign investment policy every 5-10 years, and it has exercised its prerogative in canceling partnerships after the initial contractual period finishes. economists project, the social equality of the state will most likely be an afterthought. Omar
Everleny's perspective on Vietnam as a model for Cuba does not completely agree with this critique: "Vietnam has been able to introduce the market into its model and has become an economy with high rates of growth, improving the welfare of its citizens, and becoming a leader in world exports." 82 This analysis provides that the economic growth will be widely dispersed, leading to an improvement in the standard of living for most citizens. However, current trends suggest that this might not be the case. Newspapers already cover the rise of inequality in Cuba, connecting it to President Obama's increase in remittances allowed annually and the Cuban government's easement of restrictions against private enterprise.
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As Cubans receive cash inflows from relatives in the United States, they have the opportunity to make strategic investments that are helping them become wealthy elites, and as this is happening, new tiers of classes are beginning to emerge. Some level of equality may have to be sacrificed in order to attain a higher standard of living for all citizens.
VI. Conclusion
While Cuba faces crippling obstacles and some serious disadvantages, including a lack of trust, a poor national infrastructure, an abysmal technological grid, and a very low level of worker productivity, it has the ability to reform both its infrastructure and technology in the coming years, and as it opens its shores to the international community and transitions its leadership, some of these issues will diminish in their intensity. In this context, a comprehensive study of the functions of the Cuban economy is critical as Cuba continues to develop and seek international investment. However, from this study, a few observations can be made about the next steps of Cuba's economic transition. A key comparative advantage Cuba possesses is its highly trained and educated population, combined with its investments in healthcare. Its human capital will promote investments by firms that need specialized labor, and as such, Cuba should continue to invest in higher education, while also working to attract these firms to the island. The government must continue its course to attract investment by acting as a better steward to corporations who apply for contracts. By eliminating the dual currency system, the government will reduce the tax it takes from wages, which will lead to a reduction in the cost of labor, making Cuba more competitive internationally. State-owned enterprises need to do a better job of welcoming foreign entities rather than discriminating against them, reducing the amount of unequal treatment. Moreover, the barriers should be eliminated in sectors the government does not have a vested interest in
protecting. An example where high tariffs might be beneficial is agriculture, but at the same time, the government should offer tax incentives to local citizens who make the land more productive and profitable. When the embargo ends, Cuba should be wary of the United States influence, maintaining safeguards against dependency. While this might sacrifice growth, it will protect the country against a new wave of economic dependency, and through a thoughtful economic plan, Cuba will be in a better position to integrate into the world market.
Social capital matters, and goodwill has a high intrinsic economic value. The next political leaders should be mindful of how their actions will be perceived by the international community because it will directly affect the levels of international investment. Another way of promoting better relations would be to switch dispute resolution to an international arbitrator for the next ten years in order to foster more international trust. Cuba must also manage its debt and find ways to settle old claims in order to integrate successfully into the global economy. If Vietnam is the model that the government follows, the equity and gains of the revolution should be protected by not just focusing on growth. Cuba's future is uncertain
Moore 41 both economically and politically; therefore, the decisions made by Cuban leaders today will have a major impact on the country that Cuba becomes.
Anecdote
During my time in Cuba, I spent a week on a cross-country tour of the island, and my academic cohort had a native Cuban guide that provided us with ample information about the politics, history, culture, and economy. While much of the tour seemed to be regurgitated facts, stories, and jokes, one of my exchanges with the guide captured what I believe to be an overwhelming sentiment on the island. The highways were in ill-repair, and while many developing nations have poorly constructed national infrastructures for transportation, Cuba's neglect appeared to have gone on for over fifty years. When I probed the tour guide about how the government would finance the project of rebuilding, the answer was quick, seemingly unrehearsed: "Someone else will pay for it. We need another country to build these highways and fix our buildings. Cuba is broke. The government has no money to do it."
Cuba's foreign debt echoes this statement, but the tour guide's admission points to a more glaring critique on the Cuban society. For five hundred years, Cuba has been accustomed to receiving vast injections of foreign capital and investment. The revolution promised independence, but it did not deliver.
